The oil agreement between Delcy Rodríguez and Donald Trump is told in two very different ways, depending on who is telling the story. From Miraflores, it looks like a golden opportunity: investment, foreign currency, and a country returning to production. From the White House, it looks like a 100-year concession covering 65 billion oil barrels. Neither version is entirely accurate, and hidden within that ambiguity lie the questions that really matter: How much will Venezuela actually earn? Who controls production? And what happens the day Trump is no longer in power?
To answer these questions, we spoke with Einstein Millán Arcía, a petroleum engineer with nearly 30 years of industry experience, a former manager at [Venezuela’s state oil company] PDVSA, and an advisor to state-owned oil companies in Bolivia, Kuwait, and Mexico. He was part of the team that revived PDVSA after the 2002–2004 strike [led by oil executives, business sectors and right-wing factions], so he knows the business from the inside—based on real figures rather than press reports.
In this conversation, Einstein breaks down the agreement point by point: the actual cost of producing a barrel of Venezuelan oil, the gap between what was announced and what actually reached the country’s coffers, the fine print on US participation in the company that will operate the fields, and the constitutional issue beneath it all. He also explains why, in his view, the “oil viceroyalty” that Trump has sought since his first term remains—on the evidence—a plan that cannot be sustained over time.
Is the oil deal between Trump and Delcy Rodríguez a betrayal or part of a strategy?
It’s a complex issue. If it isn’t exactly a negotiation, it’s very close to one: a pact, a concession in exchange for something. There’s a great deal of speculation, and opacity, a lack of transparency, and uncertainty reign at every level—political, geopolitical, and strictly oil-related.
In our view, it all stems from a need that was already becoming apparent in 2019, near the end of Trump’s first term. He said it publicly himself: “We almost got our hands on that oil; it would have been ours.” That gave rise to a plan that has been brewing ever since, because Trump has the mindset of a negotiator. What was missing was a link between his ambitions and a political necessity. That political necessity emerged in early January 2026 and culminated in what we all know: an invasion, the extraction of a president whom some recognize and others do not—regardless of whether he was a saint of my devotion—but it was an extraction; an invasion; no one can deny it.
Turning to the oil issue: every nation seeks to do business, seeks investments, and wants capital to flow in to develop its resources—and Venezuela is no exception. It’s a good thing when investment comes from different countries. It’s a very bad thing when the proposal is opaque, lacks transparency, and raises serious doubts about what lies behind it. The question is whether this serves Venezuela’s best interest, whether it amounts to a trade-off for power, or whether it is simply a necessity born of an increasingly complex energy situation for the United States.
There are several angles to this. By 2019, the United States had, according to its own institutions, nearly 47,000 million barrels of remaining oil reserves. By December 2025, those reserves had fallen to between 30,000 and 31,000 million. In other words, between 16,000 and 17,000 million barrels were consumed in about six years, at a rate of between 20 and 21 million barrels per day.
Before the invasion—or attempted attack—on Iran, and before the invasion of Venezuela, and while it still enjoyed good relations with Canada, the United States controlled about 42% of global production and 55% of reserves. “Controlling” here means having a military presence in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman, and steady relations with Canada. Trump’s intention in invading Iran, in seeking to gain control over Canada, and now over Venezuela, was to exceed 80% of global reserves. To secure a foothold in those reserves.
Why? Because they know that after 2035—we’ve been writing about this since 2022—nearly 60% of oil-producing countries will drop off the list due to depleted reserves. That alone will create a deficit of about 33 million barrels per day. Added to that is an increase in demand of another 20 million, for a total deficit of roughly 53 million barrels per day. The United States and consumer countries already know this, because the decline in those reserves is public and well documented. That set off alarm bells, and the plan began to take shape: control the Middle East, control Iran, and annex Venezuela’s reserves.
The plan failed with Iran. Now, instead of controlling that country, it faces the risk of a production bottleneck of between 9 and 11 million barrels per day that isn’t making it out of the Persian Gulf. The only short-term option left, in their view, was Venezuela. But the calculations are off, because no matter how much activity is generated, Venezuela will need between 18 and 24 months to ramp up production beyond an additional one million barrels. And beware of the ambiguity in the agreement itself: there are enormous differences between the information coming out of the White House and that coming out of Miraflores. Some speak of a 100-year agreement; others—those in the government—speak of 25 years.
Yes, in fact, the agreement is presented in an ambiguous way. The Venezuelan government says it will hand over 17 oil wells—without specifying which ones—that $200,000 million in investment will flow in over 25 years, and that Venezuela will keep $19 per barrel. The US government says something similar, but over 100 years, also involving 17 unspecified wells. Unofficially, however, there is talk that these would be the joint ventures that PDVSA managed with Russian and Chinese capital—Sinopec is mentioned—though everything is still up in the air.
Take a look: what the United States is actually offering is a 100-year concession tied to reserves of 65 billion barrels, spread across 17 fields—9 in the eastern Orinoco Belt and 8 between the western Lake Maracaibo and the mainland. A mix of medium-to-heavy crude in the Belt and heavy crude and condensate in the lake. These are oil fields. Now people are throwing around figures for investments, profits, price per barrel, and production costs off the cuff, with numbers that aren’t tied to anything concrete. The reality is quite different.
Let me explain the technical concept of “cost per flowing barrel.” This term links investment to the costs of producing and developing fields, including everything from drilling and bringing a well into production to compression, flow stations, processing and on-site storage, right through to the point of delivery for export. In the Athabasca Sands in Canada, the bitumen does not flow naturally as it does with our unupgraded crude from the Orinoco Belt. Sometimes it flows under initial conditions, but then it requires artificial lift. Nevertheless, in Canada, these costs do not exceed $40,000 per flowing barrel.
However, if you do the math on the investment announced by both the White House and Miraflores for a production run averaging a little over a million barrels over 25 years, it works out to about $66,700 per flowing barrel. That’s outrageous. People are unaware that the wells in the Orinoco Belt are drilled in just a single week, because they are very shallow—no deeper than 900 to 1,500 meters. And its production cost, in 2012—when the Belt was still a greenfield field producing between 1,200,000 and 1,300,000 barrels per day—was $11.09 per barrel nationwide. Weighing that cost against its share of total production, crude from the Belt—including upgrading—came to around $16 to $16.50 per barrel.
Today, they say it will cost more than $30 or $35, and some even cite $60, comparing it to the production cost of Permian crude in the United States. But if you set aside the cost of upgrading—since most refineries in the Gulf of Mexico do not need upgraded crude as they are adapted for heavy, sour crude, and some only require dilution, which is not the same as upgrading—that upgrading cost, which runs from $5 to $7 per barrel, drops out of the equation. In that case, the actual production cost could come in at $9 to $11 per barrel.
Unrealistically high production figures are being suggested, with estimates ranging from $30 to $60 per barrel, despite historical figures hovering between $16 and $20. Without even considering whether the crude is being upgraded—which is another issue entirely—Venezuela is also relinquishing part of its business: the refining of its own oil. In terms of what lies ahead for the oil sector, it is as if this agreement were handing over one of the core pillars of the oil business to US refineries.
If anything, it’s the US authorities who are manipulating costs, figures, and margins—more so than the Venezuelans. The Venezuelans either look the other way so as not to see it, or they simply aren’t aware of it—because the figures I’m giving you are official.
But it doesn’t end there. The United States, in addition to holding a 35% stake in the company that will operate as a front, also retains ownership of 20% of production at cost. That means Venezuela loses that margin: it runs from $4.50 to $6 per barrel. The US’s profit grows, and Venezuela’s margin shrinks on that front as well. No one has explained this. These are several factors that, taken together, all work to Venezuela’s detriment.
Let’s review what we know so far. According to information released by the White House, 20% of production from these 16 oil fields will be supplied to a company owned by Alejandro Betancourt, a Venezuelan businessman who made his fortune selling front companies for thermoelectric power plants. The company is called North American Blue Partners (NABEP) and already has business operations in Venezuela. It will transfer 35% of its equity stake to a US government entity—the Pentagon—free of charge, and the United States will receive 20% of the remaining production at cost. The US also has the option of acting as the exclusive buyer of an additional percentage. All of the company’s executives must be US citizens, and the US government has the right to veto any appointment it disapproves of.
Investments and costs are both being inflated. The 20% that the US government reserves from production at cost results in Venezuela losing between $4.50 and $7 per barrel. The $19 per barrel that Venezuela was said to earn drops to between $13 and $14 on that basis alone. However, as I explained earlier, investments are also being inflated, as is the cost per barrel of produced oil.
There is another point—the legal one—which I am not qualified to address, since I am not a lawyer. Nevertheless, the transfer of land, licences and oil assets for 100 years could be seen as a divestiture and almost as the confiscation of Venezuelan assets and resources, which the Constitution expressly prohibits in Article 12 by declaring them inalienable and imprescriptible. This negotiation was conducted behind the country’s back because an act expressly prohibited by the Constitution should have been put to and approved by the relevant institutions — in this case, the National Assembly. However, the Anti-Blockade Law [created in 2020] and the reform to the Organic Law on Hydrocarbons earlier this year, paved the way for the current situation. Sad but true.
It is simply not feasible for a young, emerging company like NABEP to sustain an annual investment rate of $4 billion over 25 years. The only way such an investment could be viable for a smaller company—a production-sharing company (CPP)—is through crowdfunding: hidden partners behind what they have labeled the Pentagon’s “strategic fund.” This fund allows investment opportunities to be funneled through that institution while simultaneously enabling them to claim, whenever they see fit, a share of total production or the 20% I previously mentioned, as outlined in White House press releases.
Regarding your comments on the inflated figures for investment, profits and costs: What is the purpose of inflating the numbers, aside from deceiving people?
I tend to view the situation from the perspective of the US rather than Venezuela. The most compelling evidence of this is that only $300 million of the approximately 226 million barrels officially exported since the beginning of the year has actually entered the country. I have not seen any audit results from either side. Neither the Central Bank of Venezuela nor the US Treasury has published any reports detailing how much Venezuelan money has truly made its way into the country’s coffers. This raises important questions about the current circumstances.
The Trump administration presents one narrative, while the Venezuelan government offers a contrasting viewpoint. Trump has proposed a deal, to which Venezuela has responded by suggesting different profit margins, investment amounts and timelines to those suggested by the United States.
Here are the concrete, official figures from PDVSA: In 2012, PDVSA’s national production cost, including the Orinoco Belt in full development along with all investments in exploration, development, and upgrading, was $11.09 per barrel. This is equivalent to the production projected over the next 25 years, though I believe it will take 100 years, as the United States frames it.
The process for a well in the Orinoco Belt consists of two phases: downhole dilution, which occurs when the well ceases to flow naturally, and upgrading at the delivery point to export it as Merey 16. The $16 cost, adjusted for 2012, encompasses all aspects—exploration, infrastructure, development, and upgrading.
While the United States reserves a significant portion of its production for the Gulf of Mexico, it’s important to note that most of those refineries do not require upgraded crude; they typically need only diluted crude. Therefore, if we exclude the upgrading cost—ranging from $4.50 to $7 per barrel—from our calculations, the actual production cost would fall between $9 and $11.
On the profit side, Venezuela’s assertion that the projected $200 billion over 25 years translates to a profit of $19 per barrel warrants careful examination. The 20% of production that the United States reserves at no cost will likely lead to a revenue decrease of between $5 and $8 per barrel, effectively lowering the profit margin from $19 to a range of $11 to $14. For context, during the 2007–2008 period, under the hydrocarbons law that imposed a 30% royalty and a 50% income tax, profits exceeded $45 per barrel.
These profit margins will continue to widen for the United States while Venezuela’s earnings will diminish further as oil prices rise. Starting around 2030–2035, we can expect a bottleneck in global reserves due to the decline of about 60% of producing countries. This trend is already evident today, with Brent crude priced at $93–94. By 2027–2030, the price per barrel is projected to exceed $100, and post-2030, it may surpass $135.
The difference between Venezuelan crude and the benchmark price—ranging from $7 to $12 depending on the risk premium (which peaked at $18–20 during the height of sanctions and fell to $5–6 at other times)—indicates that a barrel of Merey could easily trade above $90. As prices rise, the United States’ share of that 20% also increases, further impacting Venezuela’s profit margins.
Furthermore, if the United States becomes the sole purchaser of Venezuelan oil, Venezuela will be unable to refine it and sell it as higher-margin products such as jet fuel, lubricants, and other derivatives. The US business model focuses on purchasing crude oil for processing at their own refineries. As a result, Venezuela is relegated to the role of a basic producer that merely extracts oil and places it in barrels, effectively regressing by 60 or 70 years. Currently, Venezuelan refineries operate at a capacity of only 350,000 to 400,000 barrels per day, despite having an installed capacity of 1,200,000 barrels.
Einstein, is this project feasible over 25 years? A small company like NABEP would need to contribute $4 billion annually, and there are issues with the state of the electrical infrastructure and the ports needed for exports. In Venezuela, this agreement is presented as a means of producing more oil, bringing more foreign currency into the exchange market and government coffers, and thereby improving wages and public services. That’s the gift-wrapped version. However, there are structural flaws in the oil industry and the country’s infrastructure that suggest this is, to some extent, just random number-crunching.
When have you ever heard Trump tell the truth? He always embellishes things. I’ve never heard him speak the truth. And well, both governments are trying to win over public support. Trump has the midterms looming, and that could lead to impeachment or even his imprisonment. That’s what he’s trying to avoid. But no matter how much he wants it, Venezuela emerging as a producer isn’t going to happen anytime soon: I’ll say it again, it’ll take about 24 months for the first production. And that first production doesn’t mean building the entire infrastructure from scratch: the engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) processes require a lead time of between 1.5 and 2 years. Otherwise, you end up with a catastrophe—even more so in an industry as sensitive in terms of operational and environmental risk as the oil industry.
And as I told you, a company [NABEP] of that nature cannot finance 4 billion annually unless it has a very shady crowdfunding scheme, and that shadiness is facilitated through the front I mentioned.
Some reports have claimed that the Pentagon will invest in the project.
The Pentagon will not contribute any funding. Instead, it will facilitate investment opportunities. In essence, this is crowdfunding. You bring together a select group of people who don’t want to be in the spotlight and who provide the funding. You, with your military power, represent and protect them. This is known as “options” in the market. I hadn’t seen anything like it before, and I’m sure a Democratic Senate and Congress would eventually shut it down.
Einstein, could the United States really take the oil produced under this agreement and add it to its strategic reserves, as Trump claims?
There is a physical-chemical incompatibility because mixing different types of crude oil—heavy crude from the Orinoco Belt with the light or medium crude in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)—can lead to the formation of deposits of asphaltenes, paraffin, wax and other substances that degrade the overall quality. One is a sweet crude and the other is a sour crude; the quality would have to be upgraded to make it compatible. I should also mention that even if the crude were allocated 100% to the SPR, which is unlikely, it would still need to be upgraded because the acidity of this crude ranges from 1.5% to 2%, which is too high to be compatible with the existing reserves. That’s where the problem lies.
Trump created a major problem for himself during the Gulf War when he had to draw down strategic stockpiles in an attempt to deceive the markets after the war got out of hand. This created a dichotomy between the paper and real markets: he released strategic inventory to levels last seen in 1985–89, at a time when these stocks were just beginning to be built up. Today, they’re at around 39–40% of their historical level. As always, he blames the previous administration, but in reality it was one of Joe Biden’s finest moments. Furthermore, part of that release is due to them taking advantage of high prices to sell. However, Brent is currently trading at $93–94 for two reasons: the 9–11 million barrel bottleneck in the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran now holds sway, and the sharp drop in strategic inventories caused by their own actions. They created both: the plunge in inventories and the bottleneck with Iran. They’re geniuses. That’s when they turned to Venezuela as a last resort.
This brings us to another point. Ever since Trump attacked Venezuela and kidnapped Maduro, the US has been trying to sell the idea that the country will be a major source of oil. They are now saying that this agreement will enable the United States to boost its strategic reserves. However, few oil deals have been made so far, and many argue that this is primarily a marketing ploy intended to attract other oil companies. The message is: ‘We’ve already invested here; come on in—there’s a favourable business climate and clear rules that will stand the test of time.’ In other words, regardless of how damaging it may be for Venezuela, this also appears to be a classic sales pitch for an investment destination.
Absolutely. As I told you during our first interview in January, no multinational corporation or ‘Big Oil’ is going to risk investing in Venezuela based solely on the assumption that Trump or his group will remain in power, or that the Venezuelan acting government will be stable. Big business needs three things: security, stability and a return on investment. None of these are guaranteed in the current circumstances. Nor is stability guaranteed, given that many constitutional scholars are willing to challenge this decision in court on the grounds that it conflicts with several articles of the Constitution.
Let me play devil’s advocate. In Venezuela, a dialogue is underway to establish an institutional framework to support this agreement. Delcy Rodríguez is acting president without having been elected to the position, and she has remained in office because Maduro was kidnapped, under a legal provision that the Supreme Court of Justice has never fully clarified—because if it were to declare an “absolute absence,” it would have to call for elections. Currently, however, under the auspices of Marco Rubio, there is a dialogue between the opposition and the government to establish a roadmap for changing the leadership of the judiciary and the National Electoral Council in preparation for new elections. One might think that the intention is to “stack” the courts with certain people so that any legal challenge to this law is rejected. In other words, a whole legal and institutional framework is being created in Venezuela. The same cannot be said for the United States.
It sounds good, but it has an expiry date: the day Trump leaves office. When he leaves, the whole edifice will come crashing down. Many castles will come crashing down because the whole thing is built around him — there’s nothing else there. Everything points to him leaving sooner than many people think, whether because of the midterms, impeachment or the 2028 elections, or because he’ll be in prison. If that happens, the whole thing will come crashing down. That’s why I say we’re on the cusp of an important year: no multinational corporation will invest large sums of capital in that scenario beyond 2028.
We’re not against investment, but we want it to be clear, transparent, respectful and sovereign. It’s not because I feel like it; I’m not a pseudo-dictator or a fascist—nothing like that. Venezuela must be open to investment, not just from the United States but from all over the world, but it must be respectful and transparent and offer a win-win situation for all parties. It cannot be imposed in secret.
When we spoke earlier this year, you said that it would be impossible for Donald Trump to establish an “oil viceroyalty” in Venezuela. In light of recent events, what is your opinion on this now?
Our theory has been validated to the extent that Trump now finds himself in a position where his actions resemble a desperate act of misleading propaganda—an urgent attempt to convince investors to believe in something that lacks clarity. Based on our findings, the concept of a “viceroyalty” is fundamentally flawed. While it may gain initial traction, it ultimately cannot succeed due to a lack of transparency, inconsistent numbers, and the necessity for national involvement. Our focus is on benefiting our own country and attracting foreign investment, always in alignment with our laws, Constitution, and sovereignty. We are not looking to solve or create problems for other nations; our priority is addressing our own issues. Each country must tackle its own challenges.
The “viceroyalty” is a plan that Trump has pursued since taking office, attempting to implement it towards the end of his term. The emergence of Guaidó* coincided with the imposition of direct sanctions against PDVSA starting in 2017, aimed at undermining the Venezuelan oil industry. Despite rampant corruption, Venezuela remains a nation rich in resources and resilient people who stand in solidarity, even if they are few in number. As things stand today, this viceroyalty will not come to fruition. When propaganda intensifies, it often signals a lack of confidence; if you have a solid business model, attracting customers requires minimal promotion.
*Juan Guaidó is an opposition figure who was elected to the National Assembly in 2015. In 2019, he proclaimed himself “interim president” of Venezuela, a move that was immediately recognised by Trump’s first administration. Although Guaidó never held any real power inside Venezuela, Washington gave his faction control over Venezuela’s frozen assets abroad. The objective was to overthrow the Maduro government, but all attempts failed.
This interview was published on September by Bruno Sgarzini as an article in his X account @brunosgarzini.
Translated from Spanish by The Assembly Media team.